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ABSTRACT 
 The	Yasuní-ITT	Initiative	was	an	international	financing	scheme	in	which	the	Ecuadorian	government	agreed	to	forgo	drilling	in	the	park	in	exchange	for	foreign	compensation	in	the	amount	of	$3.6	billion	USD	over	12	years.	Embedded in a global framework of revenue 
redistribution for development, the	Yasuní-ITT	Initiative	established a model of global 
environmental care based on global North-South difference and historical ecological 
debt. In doing so, it impacted, through prospective flows of aid, the conceptualization of 
Ecuadorian sovereignty. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“The world has failed us....What we were asking for was not charity, it was joint 
responsibility in the struggle against climate change.” 
        -Rafael Correa 
Ecuador is one of the most biodiverse countries in the world, both for its flora and 
fauna as well as its three distinct regions: Costa (coast), Sierra (mountains), and Oriente 
(East). The most biodiverse region in the world, Yasuní National Park, lies in the Oriente 
provinces of Orellana and Pastaza, which make up part of the Amazon basin. The park 
itself is enormous, covering 9,820 𝑘𝑚2(or 3,792 𝑚𝑖2), and can be divided into three 
separate ecosystems (Biosphere Reserve 2011). According to Gorky Villa, an Ecuadorian 
botanist working with the Smithsonian Institute, “In just one hectare in Yasuní, there are 
more tree, shrub and liana (woody vines) species than anywhere else in the world” (Blitz 
2015). Similarly, an area of that size is estimated to contain 100,000 insect species, the 
highest diversity per unit area in the world for any plant or animal group (Global 
Conservation 2010). Yasuní was deemed a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 1989 and 
700,000 hectares of the park were declared an untouchable zone under the Correa 
administration in 2007 in order to protect the area’s biological and cultural diversity 
(BMAD Biosphere Reserve Directory). Despite the park’s recognition, it is still 
vulnerable to exploitation for its vast underground oil reserves. Over 20% of Ecuador’s 
reserves lie in the Ishpingo-Tiputini-Tambococha oil fields, with reserves estimated to be 
800 million barrels worth over $7 billion USD if tapped (Valencia 2013).
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Former Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa created the Yasuní ITT (Ishpingo-
Tiputini-Tambococha) initiative in an attempt to preserve Yasuní and usher in a new 
financing scheme for ecological preservation. The 2007 initiative stipulated that in 
exchange for foreign compensation in the amount of $3.6 billion USD over 12 years, the 
government would forgo drilling and other forms of exploitation. The ecological benefits 
would be numerous: the government estimated that over 400 million metric tons of 
carbon dioxide would be prevented from entering the atmosphere and thousands of 
animal and plant species would remain undisturbed (Associated Press 2013). The project, 
although innovative and revolutionary, failed because the necessary funds were never 
generated. In an official public address in 2013, Correa said that he was lamentably 
forced to liquidate the project’s funds, claiming they had raised 0.37% of the goal (Correa 
2013). As of today, 99% of the park remains intact, but the constant uncertainty of future 
extraction projects threatens the ecology and cultural diversity of the region (RT en 
Español 2013). The ITT initiative, though dissolved by the Correa administration in 
2013, still remains an important and pioneering tool in the study of new forms of 
environmental preservation and climate change responsibility.  
 This thesis centrally asks: How did the Yasuní ITT project transform notions of 
sovereignty and environmental care in Ecuador? The fight for Yasuní National Park’s 
preservation has raised large questions about sovereignty and global climate change 
responsibility. The ITT initiative itself is important both locally as well as internationally; 
its funds would have helped Ecuador develop substantially, but its success would also 
have globalized a new international model for how countries conceptualize climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Yasuní ITT was a way for developed countries to 
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repay part of their ecological debt while also financing a developing country. While 
developed countries have created today’s pollution problem, developing countries 
haven’t gotten to take advantage of this unchecked growth and feel pressured to move 
away from petroleum-based development. By receiving funds from the international 
community, the ITT initiative was an innovative way to give a developing country an 
edge while being ecologically responsible. Ecuador planned to benefit immensely from 
the funding and invest heavily in infrastructure and social services (Correa 2013). 
Embedded in a global framework of revenue redistribution for development, ITT 
established a model of global environmental care based on global North-South difference 
and historical ecological debt. In doing so, it impacted, through prospective flows of aid, 
the conceptualization of Ecuadorian sovereignty.  
 This thesis argues that the Yasuní-ITT initiative was a means for the Ecuadorian 
government to realize its goals of sustainable economic development. The Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative facilitated the notion of global green sovereignty, an idea that encourages all 
nations to transcend their political and ideological differences in order to take co-
responsibility for mitigating climate change. The initiative proposed a redistribution 
framework as an alternative to extractivist fueled development. The dynamics and 
implications of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative are systematically evaluated in two chapters: the 
first chapter discusses the politics of the Correa administrations and its promotion of the 
Yasuní-ITT Initiative; the second chapter presents an overview of the international 
politics concerning Yasuní and climate change financing mechanisms. 
 While the ITT initiative has been widely published and researched, I add a new 
perspective on international politics concerning climate change responsibility. The ITT 
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initiative was a financing mechanism in which money was raised internationally, 
collectively deposited into a UN fund, and distributed to the Ecuadorian government. 
This challenges notions of sovereignty both locally and internationally. I argue that the 
Ecuadorian government, through the Yasuní ITT initiative, sought to create a form of 
global green sovereignty based on a framework of redistribution as an alternative to 
extractivist fueled development. This global green sovereignty stresses the abdication of 
national autonomy over development in favor of a post-petroleum economy. Global green 
sovereignty is an idea that encourages joint responsibility in the development of 
sustainable energy alternatives. Global solidarity in efforts to fight against climate change 
would transcend political and ideological differences, therefore transcending traditional 
notions of national sovereignty. Global green sovereignty would rely on a framework of 
redistribution as an alternative to extractivist fueled development. Redistributive 
networks at the global scale abdicate national autonomy over development in favor of a 
post-petroleum economy.  
 
1.2 Methodology 
 To answer my research question, I conduct a qualitative analysis of a variety of 
sources from local, national, and international publications. This qualitative interpretative 
analysis used the research software program NVivo. I used NVivo to store, code, and 
analyze data from texts as well as video transcriptions. NVivo helped generate themes 
and show relations between topics by using digital mapping and counting the number of 
codes. The themes generated by NVivo guided my research questions and helped me 
determine what was important. Each of my content chapters draws from academic 
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sources such as scholarly journals and books. In addition, I reference primary documents 
and sources from economic and country data, the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution, U.N. 
publications, government publications, and official speeches given by the Rafael Correa. 
I also use social media accounts to show a different perspective from what Ecuadorian 
state media publishes. Similarly, I analyze published statements from NGOs and foreign 
nations in the form of press releases, speeches, and social media publications. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 This chapter is divided into four sections, each of which provides an aspect drawn 
from existing literature. The chapter discusses Ecuadorian involvement in environmental 
conservation efforts as well as its history of dependence on petroleum resources, a 
dependency that often contradicts government policies such as the Correa 
administration’s promotion of the Yasuní ITT Initiative. The first two sections discuss 
Ecuadorian economic policy and the idea of the oil curse. The third section looks at the 
Correa administration’s oil politics and response to oil dependency. The fourth section 
examines climate change financing, the limitations of the existing mechanisms, and how 
the Yasuní-ITT Initiative was an attempt to seek alternative revenue sources. This chapter 
uses economic data, the Ecuadorian constitution, a general history of oil discovery in the 
Amazon from Suzanne Sawyer’s book Crude Chronicles, UNFCC publications, and the 
Yasuní Trust. The chapter concludes by positioning the thesis argument in relation to this 
body of scholarship. 
 
2.1 General History of Ecuador: Protectionism, Neoliberalism, 21st Century 
Socialism 
 
Economically, Ecuador has struggled with maintaining stability due to border 
wars, internal political divisions, and government misuse and dependence on borrowing 
(Corporation of Foreign Bondholders). Government spending was reckless 
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and generally not used for public works or infrastructure. Poor economic policies often 
caused rampant inflation and political uncertainty, leading to a lack of faith in 
government systems (Kaminsky 2014).  
Ecuador’s development can be viewed through three main approaches to 
economics. Post-independence governments focused primarily on developing the state 
through protectionist economic policies. These policies limited trade between countries 
and brought high tariffs, allowing for extreme government regulation (Choudhri 2000). 
While the Ecuadorian economy prior to the 1960’s was protected from foreign 
competition, protectionism restricted exports and stagnated economic growth and 
diversification (Coatsworth 2002). The Ecuadorian economy remained dependent on 
banana and other agricultural exports until the petroleum discovery and boom (Choudhri 
2000). 
Ecuador’s transition into a neoliberalist era is chiefly due to the United States’ 
increased global influence during the 1980’s and 1990’s in Latin America. U.S. 
Presidents Reagan and Clinton were interested in expanding trade networks and fostering 
democracy, utilizing a free market laissez-faire economic model to encourage this 
paradigm (Walton 2004: 170). Under the Clinton administration, the implementation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) promoted trade liberalization and aimed to “reduce poverty, encourage 
development, and good governance” (WTO 2009). To increase the private sector’s 
influence in the economy and society, Ecuador implemented economic liberalization 
strategies such as increased privatization, deregulation, and austerity measures that 
decreased government spending (Pimentel 2014). Despite neoliberalism’s success in 
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European and American economies, it largely failed to provide a sustainable economic 
framework in Ecuador and throughout much of Latin America. Critics of neoliberalism, 
such as Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa argue that trade liberalization only worsened 
regional inequalities, increased poverty, and disproportionately benefited Northern 
countries at the expense of the others (Dunn 2009: 27). 
During the early 2000’s, neoliberal policies were extremely unpopular. 
Ecuadorian presidential candidates Abdula Bucaram and Lucio Gutierrez campaigned 
advocated for economic liberalization and the reorganization of Ecuadorian society. 
However, Ecuador did not shift into its true post-neoliberal model until Rafael Correa’s 
first election in 2006. Correa, inspired by Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian Socialist model, 
sought to increase the welfare state and government control while decreasing the 
influence of the private sector. Correa’s neo-developmentalist model maintains a 
capitalist economy, however it is highly regulated. Heavy government influence is also 
apparent in its creation of a welfare state. The Correa administration aimed to provide a 
social safety net for all citizens, a socialist aspect of Correa’s model. Through this model, 
Correa has been successful in transitioning away from neoliberalism and creating a new 
paradigm, dubbed “21st century socialism” (Gamso 2015). Under Correa, the global 
engagement of the Ecuadorian economy was neither protectionist nor isolationist, but 
instead was intended to protect national interests but also attract foreign investment in 
key sectors. Rather than increasing Ecuador’s foreign debt by taking out loans to fuel 
growth, Correa created a new means for financing development. The ITT Initiative is a 
hallmark example of the Correa administration’s goal of gaining revenue from alternative 
creditors in order to invest in social spending. 
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2.2 “The Oil Curse” 
The “oil curse” is a phrase coined by regional analysts to try to explain the 
economic paradox that seems to occur in countries with large amounts of natural 
resources. Basic economic theory predicts that a country with lots of capital, or oil, 
should produce high levels of investment-fueled growth (Ross 2013: 199). However, oil 
economies are inherently unstable because they are tied to oil prices, a commodity that is 
always fluctuating (Ross 2013: 206). This means that during an oil shock, GDP can rise 
very quickly or can plummet and never recover. Countries with high oil dependency have 
low levels of industrialization and small industrial sectors. Oil booms create demand for 
oil related investments, causing all labor to be concentrated and the economy to lack 
dynamism. Oil booms bring in influxes of foreign currency, which make it cheaper to buy 
foreign goods, which in turn hurts the local economy (Ross 2013: 220).  
 
2.3 Oil Politics under The Correa Administration 
 The Correa administration has been criticized for its overspending and borrowing, 
especially following two devastating earthquakes that caused the country to remain in an 
economic recession since 2015. Correa invested heavily in public infrastructure such as 
roads, hydroelectric power plants, and oil refineries. Correa aimed to change Ecuador’s 
development model but lacked the monetary resources to fully realize his projects.  
“It [Ecuador] has to change its development model, and this requires financial resources that it 
 does not have. Following this logic, Rafael Correa argues that  natural resources must be exploited 
 to finance structural reforms.” (Silva, Gallegos, Le Quang 2016: 192) 
 
Correa campaigned as the socially and environmentally conscious candidate who 
promised to make policies that kept equality and the indigenous concept of Buen Vivir in 
mind (Acosta 2010:6). However, the Correa administration’s continued mineral 
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extraction is incongruous with the idea of Buen Vivir, which seeks to protect nature and 
better ways of life for all involved (Silva, Gallegos, Le Quang 2016: 194). 
 “Considering these logics are at odds with each other relies on the supposition that 
 environmentalism and indigenous cosmovisions/philosophies-and indigenous people 
 themselves-are anathema to the practices of natural resource capitalism  and neoliberalism” (Lu, 
 Silva and Valdivia 2017:90). 
 
After Correa’s election he reconvened the Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly to draft a 
new constitution on April 15, 2007. The motion passed with 80% approval; the approval 
rate was probably so high because the Assembly consisted of members of Correa’s 
political party. The first assembly met in Montecristi in November 2007 and the new 
constitution was approved in July 2008. In its 494 articles, the phrase ‘buen vivir’ is 
mentioned 23 times (Becker 2011:53). The Constitution is revolutionary in that it is the 
first to legally recognize the Rights of Nature. Article 71-74 prohibits the extraction of 
national non-renewable resources in protected areas that are delineated by the 
government. The 2008 Constitution and the ITT Initiative were idealized versions of 
Correa’s project to link ecological consciousness and greater indigenous involvement. 
 
2.4 Contemporary Environmental Politics: the Yasuní ITT Initiative 
Correa sought an alternative method of financing for his socialist reforms beyond 
traditional methods of resource extraction. Through the Yasuní ITT-Initiative, Correa 
created a new type of climate financing that utilized local, national, and transnational 
networks to generate revenue. Correa argued that climate financing is a necessary tactic 
to reduce the effects of climate change, specifically in efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions while also helping developing countries grow their economies in a sustainable 
manner.  
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The Yasuní ITT-Initiative relied upon the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, a United Nations 
Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCC) agreement that committed its 
members to a binding contract to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (UNFCC 2010). 
The Initiative offered a means for these countries to reduce their emissions and take part 
in “global co-responsibility,” (Fankhauser 2013). The idea of industrialized countries 
providing these financial resources in order to pay for their ecological debt emerged 
during the 2009 climate change summit in Copenhagen. According to the UNFCC, 
developing countries only receive 20-25% of the necessary funding in order to mitigate 
climate effects and develop economically (Fankhauser 2013). The lack of necessary 
funding is in part due to the lack of participation from developed countries as well as a 
lack of direct access to these funds. In order for climate financing to increase, the 
channels in which developing countries have access to these resources must be 
“predictable, sustainable, and available directly” while also demonstrating that they are 
able to “effectively receive and utilize the resources” (UNFCC 2010). The primary 
concern that developed countries have is proper use of their financial contributions which 
requires transparency in the institutional framework and projects. Developing and 
developed countries must work together and transcend their differences in order to 
achieve a working climate change financing mechanism.  
Several mechanisms that help developing countries receive aid are in place. The 
Green Climate Fund (GCF), created in 2010, allocates resources to specific projects such 
as the Least Developed Countries Fund (GCF 2011). At the 2009 climate change summit 
in Copenhagen, developed countries committed to giving $30 billion between 2010-2012 
to the GCF and eventually increasing the funding to $100 billion per year starting in 
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2020. This “fast-start financing model” is one of the most recent modules in which 
developing countries can appeal for climate financing.  
In addition to the GCF, a high-level advisory group (AGF) was established in 
2010 by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon that looks for alternative sources and 
financing methods (International Civil Aviation Organization). The group proposed in 
2012 that new revenue raising methods such as mandatory government pledges, market 
levies, and a financial transaction tax could raise the money necessary to meet the needs 
of developing countries (Fankhauser 2013). None of these alternative methods have been 
implemented, but the presence of this group indicates awareness about climate financing 
and its current shortcomings. 
Developing countries have also been wary of receiving financing through 
international institutions like the World Bank because they would be under their 
jurisdiction and subjected to possibly demanding or manipulative conditions. An 
alternative would be a specialized national fund that would secure direct access and 
financial allocation to the receiving country. The Yasuní ITT initiative is an example of 
this type of national fund; money was placed in a UN Trust that would be distributed to 
organizations and projects that the Ecuadorian government detailed in the arrangement.  
 The Yasuní ITT-Initiative was far reaching in its implications and effect on the 
concept of global co-responsibility. The initiative offered developed and developing 
countries a new cooperative model that would allow the “world to consider more just and 
equitable paradigms of sustainable development,” (ITT Trust 2010:3). The Yasuní ITT 
Trust Fund or Yasuní Fund allowed the international community to safely invest in local 
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Ecuadorian sustainable development models, such as renewable energy projects such as 
hydro, geothermal, solar, wind, biomass and tidal power plants (ITT Trust 2010:5).  
 
2.5 Conclusion and Contribution 
 This thesis argues that the Yasuní-ITT initiative was a means for the Correa 
government to realize its goal of long-term sustainable economic development. The 
initiative was based upon a vision of global green sovereignty, an idea that encourages all 
nations to transcend their political and ideological differences in order to take co-
responsibility for mitigating climate change. The initiative proposed a redistribution 
framework as an alternative to extractivist fueled development.  
 My thesis offers a unique contribution to literature surrounding environmental 
care and climate change responsibility. This thesis contributes the new concept of global 
green sovereignty, a term that describes the goal of realizing alternatives to extraction-
fueled economic development in favor of sustainable methods that are supported and 
promoted at the international level. No previous literature links the concepts of climate 
change responsibility and sustainable development in developing countries like Ecuador. 
My thesis provides a unique perspective on Ecuadorian political and economic histories 
and how each aspect has shaped the Correa administration’s sustainable development 
platform.  
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Chapter 3: The Correa Administrations: Making Strides toward Social and 
Environmental Revolution 
 
 
 In this chapter I explore how the Correa administration has promoted the ITT 
initiative and whether the administration’s economic and social policies reflect Correa’s 
environmental agenda. I argue that the Correa administration has sought out alternative 
energy and financing as a means of beginning to unwind oil dependency and create a 
post-petroleum society ground in the ideas of Buen Vivir. To ground my argument this 
chapter systematically reviews key themes from the Correa administration’s publications 
and speeches, speeches from Correa’s political campaign prior to election in 2007 and re-
election in 2012, social media accounts, and the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution.1 This 
chapter consists of three sections, each with a different focus. In the first section I address 
Revolución Ciudadana and how its attention to public spending shaped the Correa 
administration’s promotion of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and sustainable development. 
The second section focuses on Buen Vivir; the primary vehicle for implementing the 
social equality promoted by Buen Vivir was through the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution. 																																								 																					1	The first interview with Rafael Correa that I analyze was published by the New Left Review, a London 
based monthly journal focused on key political issues. The interview was conducted in 2012 and is titled 
“Ecuador’s Path” where Correa responds to questions about his political views and his accomplishments 
during his first term. The second speech I analyze is Correa’s 2007 speech at the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. The speech was part of a dialogue concerning climate change and Correa utilized his time 
to illustrate the ways in which Ecuador was contributing to reducing their ecological footprint, including 
the Yasuní ITT Initiative. I draw from the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution, both in Spanish and the English 
translation available through Georgetown University. From there I analyze the Correa administration’s 
various publications, such as tables from the Ministries of Finance, Tourism, and the Environment, all of 
which are accessible to the public on the Ecuadorian government website. Finally, I use Rafael Correa’s 
social media accounts such as his Twitter page where he promotes and reiterates his political agenda.  	
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The Constitution also articulates the Correa administration’s environmental policies and intentions	to	pursue sustainable development. The third section discusses how Ecuador’s 
history of oil dependency caused the Correa administration to seek alternative energy 
sources, ultimately accepting Chinese financing for the construction of hydroelectric 
facilities. 
 
3.1 Revolución Ciudadana 
 Rafael Correa’s decade long presidency gave Ecuador a period of political 
stability that it had not seen in almost a century. He completed two five-year terms, from 
2007 to 2012 and from 2012 to 2017, making him the first Ecuadorian president to 
complete two full terms in eighty years. The Correa administration’s permanence can be 
attributed to his attention to social welfare. Correa’s political platform appealed to the 
largest portion of Ecuadorian society: the poor and socially marginalized who benefitted 
the most from his Citizen’s Revolution (Silva 2009:64).2 
 Correa’s presidential platform during the 2007 election was a rejection of 
neoliberal policies and instead a transition toward a democratic socialist model. He called 
this transition the “Revolución Ciudadana,”3 in which the government would prioritize 
healthcare, education, and technological improvement financed through resource 
extraction. To carry out this rhetoric, Correa formed a new political party, Alianza PAIS, 																																								 																					
2 Rafael Correa received an economics degree from La Universidad Católica de Santiago de Guayaquil in 
1987. He studied in Belgium and the United States and received a Master’s degree in 1999 and a Doctorate 
in 2001. Correa’s college dissertation for the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, foreshadowed his 
political policies during his presidency; he argues that neoliberal economic policies imposed during the 
1980’s are the primary reason for Latin America’s stagnated growth and lack of wealth (Correa 2001, 
“Three Essays”). 
3 Citizen’s Revolution	
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which allowed him to gain votes from a previously polarized political system 
(Kennemore&Weeks 2011: 274). Correa used Alianza PAIS as a medium for uniting and 
reshaping Ecuador to become a source of pride and a model for other Latin American 
countries (New Left Review 2012). Correa’s changed Ecuador would see an end to 
partidocracia, the political system ruled by Ecuadorian elites that were considered 
responsible for the political and economic instability in the 2000’s (Machado Puertas 
2007: 133). Alianza PAIS won 100 of 131 seats in the National Assembly election and 
this dominance allowed Correa’s popularity and credibility to grow (de la Torre 
2013:38). In an interview with The New Left Review in 2012, Correa speaks about the 
formation and intention of the Citizen’s Revolution: 
“During the campaign we were clearly aware that what we were proposing was a revolution, 
understood as a radical and rapid change in the existing structures of Ecuadorean society, in order to 
change the bourgeois state into a truly popular one. Faced with the delegitimization of the political 
class, which no longer represented anyone except itself, we said to ourselves that it was we citizens 
who had to reveal its inadequacies. So we decided to call it a citizens’ revolution, a revolt of indignant 
citizens. In that sense we anticipated the recent indignado movement in Europe by five or six years. 
But the movement was also profoundly Bolivarian, in terms of regional integration. And we are also 
inspired by Eloy Alfaro’s liberal revolution—the only real revolution to have occurred in this country 
before ours. This was why Alfaro was assassinated in 1912, in barbaric fashion, because he was really 
changing the structures of the country at the time.” (Correa, New Left Review) 
 
 The Citizen’s Revolution was a phrase widely used in both the 2007 and 2012 
elections to represent Correa’s ideal of “21st century socialism,” (Kennemore&Weeks 
2011:268). Correa utilizes the socialist concept of overthrowing the current paradigm, the 
bourgeois state and the partidocracia, and replacing it with a popular, socially democratic 
model. The mechanism of change would be “indignant” Ecuadorian citizens, those who 
would support him and be the catalysts for city and nationwide change. Correa compares 
his revolution to the modern Bolivarian movement and its leader, former Venezuelan 
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president Hugo Chavez.4 Both Chavez and Correa’s form of democratic socialism seek to 
maintain a capitalist economy, create a strong welfare system, and consolidate a strong 
public sector with some nationalized utilities and resources (Lu, Valdivia, Silva 2017:14). 
Correa’s policies have largely upheld this model; Ecuador’s economy is capitalist in 
nature: there are open markets and a low tariff rate of 5.2% (2017 Index of Economic 
Freedom). However, Correa has limited the private sector and has expanded the state-
controlled public sector (Lu, Valdivia, Silva 2017:84). Government spending and debt 
have increased in order to finance the socialist reforms advertised in Correa’s revolution. 
The data set below illustrates Ecuador’s debt to GDP ration from 2008 projected through 
2018: 
Figure 3.1 Ecuador’s Government Debt to GDP 
 Ecuador’s debt to GDP ratio in 2008 was 22.2 and has increased to 39.6 in 2016 
(Trading Economics). The countrywide revolution promoted greater urbanization through 
government funded development projects for building infrastructure and diversifying 
technological sectors (Lu, Valdivia, Silva 2017:85). Development would benefit citizens 
																																								 																					4	It is important to note that Chavez’s model exhibited authoritarian elements such as state censorship, 
strong military control, and suppression of democratic freedoms.	
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as well as the country as a whole by increasing efficiency, creating jobs, and attracting 
investment opportunities. 
 The Correa administration further benefitted the poorest strata of society by 
doubling welfare payments to poor households, doubling the allowed amount of housing 
loans to $3600 USD, and creating subsidies on electricity for low-income families (Lu, 
Valdivia, Silva 2017:118). The Correa administration even changed the name of the 
Welfare Ministry to the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion in order to emphasize 
his social policy changes.  
 In many ways Correa’s revolution is a political alternative that uses government 
capital and foreign financing to fund development projects. In effect, Correa has used 
21st century socialism as a symbol of “post-neoliberalism” in Latin America (Lu, 
Valdivia, Silva 2017:170). Correa also used the “post-neoliberalism” as a slogan for 
justifying greater government control, petitioning to rewrite the Constitution of 
Montecristi in 2008 (De Sousa Santos 2010). The revised constitution grants Correa 
executive power that eliminated the Constituent Assembly and other bodies of 
government (Bowen 2015:100).  
 
3.2 Buen Vivir and Environmental Politics 
Correa’s revised Constitution ratified in 2008 consists of 440 articles that address 
a variety of social, civil, and political issues. The Constitution was intended to bring 
about the changes Correa promised in his Citizen’s Revolution such as access to 
education and the protection of nature. Correa promoted the new Constitution by 
claiming it was written based on the premise of Buen Vivir, an indigenous concept of 
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“living well” that would ensure greater equality and prosperity (Lu, Valdivia, Silva 
2017:115). Based on a systematic review of the Constitution, there are a number of key 
concepts relevant to my argument. 
 The first point is the recognition and emphasis placed on Buen Vivir as the goal 
for Ecuadorian development. In an interview for the Pachamama Alliance’s newsletter, 
Rafael Correa touches on how he has interpreted and incorporated Buen Vivir into his 
political ideology: 
 “The good life is not a utopian dream. The concept has deep and ancient roots in the 
 cosmovision of indigenous peoples, where nature and man coexist in harmony. From this 
 indigenous perspective, equitable and sustainable living has priority over development driven by 
 the neoliberal ideology of markets,” (Pachamama Alliance 2010) 
 
Correa adapted the idea of Buen Vivir to be a rallying point for his Citizen’s Revolution. 
Buen Vivir became the slogan for a comfortable life without suffering caused by social 
inequality and neoliberal policies that reinforce social stratification. Buen Vivir is seen to 
be the antithesis to modern Ecuadorian society that is entrenched in capitalism and 
largely ignores human rights (Escobar 2010:25). Buen Vivir in its purest form promotes 
an alternative and equitable economic model; this new type of economic solidarity would 
replace monopolies and create a balanced relationship between the international market, 
the state, and society (Acosta 2009).  
 The second point illustrates how the Correa administration utilizes the idea of 
Buen Vivir in conjunction with the Citizen’s Revolution as the foundation for the 2008 
Constitution. In an interview with The New Left Review in 2012, Correa responds to a 
question about what impact indigenous communities have had on his political ideology: 
  “Their [indigenous] contribution has been of great importance. The indigenous communities 
 have posed fundamental challenges to traditional notions of citizenship. This can be seen in 
 the new Constitution in several ways. We now define our republic as a ‘pluri-national’ state, 
 recognizing the indigenous communities as fundamental and distinct entities, endowed with 
 distinct rights and status. It is also largely thanks to the indigenous communities that nature 
	 20	
 itself is recognized as a fundamental value in trust to the nation. The philosophical principles 
 of sumak kawsay stress the primacy of use value over exchange value, and this has helped to 
 shape our policies. While we insist that we need real development, we do not identify this 
 narrowly with GDP defined in monetary terms, but instead take full account of its costs and 
 consequences at every level, imposing the most stringent controls. The indigenous have an 
 important role to play in defining our values—but of course, there is diversity within and  amongst 
 the indigenous communities, so there is a need for continuing dialogue concerning the specific 
 implications of our principles in practice.” (Correa, New Left Review) 
 
In addition to giving indigenous communities more consideration, Correa is proposing 
that his administration will also consider nature and how it is utilized. Correa emphasizes 
that development can take several forms and should not just be based on GDP but also 
through social progress. Ecuador was the first country to officially grant rights to nature 
in a Constitution, making Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution and attention to Buen Vivir 
revolutionary. The 2008 Constitution gave the Correa administration power to enact 
economic, educational, and social change (Bowen 2015:100). The Correa administration 
was also allowed to increase the government budget and social spending despite 
combatting rising debts. Correa’s economic policies were intended to foster “growth that 
favors the poor, growth with social justice, and growth with equity,” (Germanos 2016). 
The primary achievements of the Correa administration were the creation of a social 
security net for the poor and a government initiative for universal healthcare.  
 The Correa administration expressed hesitation and dislike towards the IMF and 
other creditors because of Ecuador’s history of sovereign default (Ecuador and the IMF 
2014). Correa blamed unfair policies that inherently take advantage of debtor countries 
like Ecuador by charging insurmountable interest rates (Atlas Network 2016). To finance 
new development projects, the Correa administration looked for alternative means to 
finance their socialist reforms. Despite its initial unpopularity, Correa implemented a 2% 
sales tax increase, higher taxes on wealth for millionaires, and the sale of government 
assets (Lu, Valdivia, Gallegos 2017:116). The Correa administration also found 
	 21	
alternative financing through foreign investment and international climate change 
resources, such as Chinese loans and Yasuní ITT initiative contributions. These 
alternative revenue sources allowed the Correa administration to immediately begin 
development because they offered immediate access to capital.  
 The third point most concretely illustrates the ways in which the Correa 
administration realizes its goal of sustainable development within the 21st century 
socialist model. While capitalist policies encourage the destruction of nature for monetary 
gain, Correa’s capitalism with an incorporation of Buen Vivir would respect the 
environment and allow it the right to resist exploitation (Acosta 2009). The Constitution 
includes a set of rights for nature; it addresses the importance of achieving harmony 
between man and nature: 
 Art. 72 . Nature has the right to restoration. This integral restoration is independent of the 
 obligation on natural and juridical persons or the State to indemnify the people and the 
 collectives that depend on the natural systems. In the cases of severe or permanent 
 environmental impact, including the ones caused by the exploitation on non-renewable natural  
 resources, the State will establish the most efficient mechanisms for the restoration, and will 
 adopt the adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate the harmful environmental 
 consequences.  
 Art. 73 . The State will apply precaution and restriction measures in all the activities that can 
 lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of the ecosystems or the permanent alteration 
 of the natural cycles. The introduction of organisms and organic and inorganic material that 
 can alter in a definitive way the national genetic patrimony is prohibited.5  
 
In Article 72 the Correa administration implies that it will continue to utilize non-
renewable resource extraction in addition to alternative energy sources. What is left 
unclear is what form the government restoration will take and what exactly will qualify as 
“severe or permanent environmental impact.” Many environmentalists argue that any 
type of resource extraction, specifically petroleum and mining sites, cause irreparable 
damage to ecosystems and are in no way congruent with sustainable development (Silva, 																																								 																					
5 “República Del Ecuador Republic of Ecuador Constitution of 2008 Constitucion De 2008.” Ecuador: 
2008 Constitution in English, Political Database of the Americas, 20 Oct. 2008. 
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Gallegos, Le Quang 2016: 194). In addition, the Constitution does not include any 
reflections on how resource extraction projects culturally affect indigenous communities. 
Construction of petroleum sites within indigenous territory has historically caused 
tensions over land ownership and sovereignty as well as highlighted the cultural impacts 
of external actors and capital (Sawyer 2004:12).  
 
3.3 Oil Dependence and Alternative Energy  
 When Correa assumed the presidency, Ecuador was experiencing an economic 
crisis due to falling oil prices and strain on international exchange markets. Ecuador’s 
dependency on oil and lack of a diversified and independent economy has caused 
economic crises since the 1980s (Sawyer 2004: 22). Oil has been both the problem and 
the solution to Ecuador’s economic instability. While oil extraction provided periods of 
growth in the 1980’s, the Ecuadorian government had taken out several loans with the 
IMF to cover what areas of the economy oil exports were not supporting (Sawyer 2004: 
23). “Endeudamiento agresivo,” aggressive indebtedness, was an official economic 
policy in the 1970s (Silva, Gallegos, Le Quang 2016:7). While the GDP grew 147% 
between 1970 and 1981, the economy was not diversified to support growth or withstand 
economic shocks (Sawyer 2004:11). Ecuador struggled to repay loans from the 1970’s 
due to bondholder’s policies and economic strain (Kaminsky&Vega 2014:2). Correa 
blames the bondholder’s foreign interest rates for domestic increases in unemployment, 
inflation of goods, and lower wages (Moser 1993:184). Correa declared a debt 
moratorium in 2008 causing soured relations with the IMF and difficulty in receiving 
future credit, ultimately prompting Correa to seek Chinese investment (Neher 2013).  
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 Correa has embraced Chinese capital as a method of alternative financing, 
choosing to allow China to build infrastructure in exchange for a slice of oil and 
hydroelectricity revenues. Latin America supplies China with raw materials but is also 
heavily reliant upon Chinese manufactured goods and technologies, creating an incentive 
for trade relations (Lucci 2014:4). It is estimated that Ecuador sells more than half of its 
petroleum to China, an extreme shift from a decade prior when the U.S. was the main 
recipient (Lucci 2014:6). China has built large pieces of infrastructure including six 
hydroelectric facilities and numerous highways under the Correa administration 
(Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo). Correa speaks warmly about their 
partnership: 
 “What a developing country like Ecuador needs is financing, and we have been able to have 
 that with China.6 Chinese financing has permitted us to be the Latin American country with the 
 most public investment and has transformed the infrastructure of the country.7 It is not only 
 without conditions, it does not come with conditions, but also comes with technology 
 exchange.8” (Sputnik Mundo 2016) 
 
Correa credits China with providing the capital needed to fund public development 
projects while also being a key investor in improving urban and oil infrastructure. In 
many ways, China has been the driving economic force behind the Citizen’s Revolution 
(Lucci 2014: 18).   
 Coca-Codo Hydroelectric Facility located in the Napo province in eastern 
Ecuador was the first hydroelectric power facility built in Ecuador. The $200 million 
USD project completed in 2010 was the biggest project undertaken by the Ecuadorian 																																								 																					
6 "lo que necesita un país en vías de desarrollo, como Ecuador, es financiamiento y lo hemos podido tener 
con China" 
7 "El financiamiento chino nos permitió ser el país de América Latina con mayor inversión pública y 
transformar la infraestructura del país” 
8 “no es solo sin condicionamientos, no tiene condicionamientos, (pero) también viene con transferencia 
tecnológica" 
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and Chinese governments until Sopladora the following year (Secretaría Nacional de 
Planificación y Desarrollo). The installation can generate 1,500 MW which, according to 
the Environmental Ministry: 
 “Achieves the highest technical standards and contributes to the preservation of ecosystems and 
the recognition of communities in this zone and all Ecuadorians.”9  
 
Figure 3.2 Coca-Codo Hydroelectric Facility 
 
Chinese factory information is visible on the left as well as the Ecuadorian seal and 
colors of the flag on the right, serving as a reminder of the countries’ partnership and the 
national government’s contribution to development.  
 Not only does Coca-Codo provide revenue for the country, it utilizes an 
alternative energy source that does not contribute to the degradation of the surrounding 
environments. This facility has become a source of pride for the Ecuadorian government, 
especially the Correa administration who is credited for beginning to “transform the 
energy matrix to guarantee the development of the country,” (Secretaría Nacional de 
Planificación y Desarrollo).  
																																								 																					
9 Ecuador, Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarollo. “Proyectos Emblemáticos En Napo.” 
Proyectos Emblemáticos En Napo, 2013. www.planificacion.gob.ec. 	
	 25	
 Sopladora Hydroelectric Project is one of the first projects that the Ecuadorian 
government has agreed to build with Chinese financing and illustrates the Correa 
administration’s pursuit of alternative energy. The Sopladora project cost an estimated 
$571 million USD financed through China’s Eximbank and is an effort to reduce 
Ecuador’s dependency on fossil fuels (Lucci 2014:3). Sopladora is the first underground 
hydroelectric plant, unlike the above ground Coca-Codo facility, and it can produce up to 
487 MWs (Lucci 2014:4). In the table below, one can see that Sopladora is the smallest 
loan financed; however, Correa has stated that Sopladora is the first of eight similar 
underground projects. If this goal is realized in the current Moreno administration (2017-
present), the hydroelectric series would be the most expensive loans Ecuador has ever 
financed, an estimated $4.5 billion.  
Figure 3.3 Chinese Loans to Ecuador (2007-2012) 
 
 
These projects were a sense of pride for Correa’s administration, who tweeted in 2011: 
 “We will visit the giant hydroelectric project, Sopladora (Whisperer), now under 
 construction. The Revolution does not walk, it runs!” 
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Figure 3.4 Rafael Correa Sopladora Tweet 
 
Sopladora and Coca-Codo Hydroelectric Facilities are important because they mark the 
Correa administration’s intentions to find alternative renewable energy sources. 
Developing renewable energies also reinforces Correa’s commitment to protecting 
biodiversity through sustainable and environmentally conscious development. The tweet 
above also illustrates how the Correa administration utilized the projects to promote the 
Citizen’s Revolution through the 2012 elections and beyond.  
 It is worth noting that Chinese investment does not come without a price; Correa 
has assured that Ecuador’s debt to China is “strictly acceptable and manageable,” 
(Sputnik Mundo 2016).10 Currently, Ecuador’s debt to China represents 8% of the GDP 
(Sputnik Mundo 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																								 																					
10 "es estrictamente aceptable y manejable" 
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Figure 3.5 (left) Hydroelectric Project Coca-Codo located in Napo 
 
Figure 3.6 (right) Oil reserves present in neighboring Orellana and Pastaza 
Provinces, site of the Yasuní National Park. Chinese investment is widespread and 
concentrated in areas with exploitable natural resources 
 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 The Correa administration has encountered resistance from environmentalists, 
indigenous groups, and many wealthy, conservative elites. Correa’s most criticized act as 
president was also his most revolutionary (Keyman 2015). His decision to rewrite the 
Constitution and to increase the size and spending of the government was pivotal to being 
able to complete his development goals promised in the Citizen’s Revolution. Although 
80% of citizens supported his decision, others considered it to be “a violation of 
democracy that allowed him unlimited power.”11  The Constitution articulates the Correa 
																																								 																					
11 “Para lograr semejante crecimiento del tamaño y envergadura del Estado, tuvieron que pisotear el orden 
constitucional vigente…ejerció poderes ilimitados.”  
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administration’s environmental politics, chiefly its commitment to sustainable 
development and the realization of Buen Vivir.  
 The physical and infrastructural changes that Ecuador has experienced during the 
Correa administrations are extensive. Totaling almost $26 billion USD, Correa has 
invested four times as much as the previous four administrations combined (Ecuador, 
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo). Statistically, Correa has been 
successful in implementing his goal of increasing equality and the standard of living. 
Ecuador’s Gini coefficient has decreased 8 points, from 54.3 in 2007 to 46.5 in 2015 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). The poverty rate decreased from 35.7% in 2007 to 
22.5% in 2014 and minimum wage increased by 45% and social security by 39% since 
2008 (Ecuador, Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo). Correa has facilitated 
social mobility by increasing social spending and access to greater resources, financed in 
part by petroleum extraction, foreign loans, and newly established alternative energy 
sources. The Correa administration’s partnership with China is the main contributor to 
the realization of the Citizen’s Revolution. 
 The Correa administrations have stimulated the economy by stabilizing the 
political arena. This has attracted investors and foreign capital to aid the Citizen’s 
Revolution. Correa has asked investors to help with over 85 strategic projects the country 
has begun building (El Universo 2016). Correa asks that investors consider helping 
Ecuador recuperate considering harsh economic conditions brought on by falling oil 
prices and a devastating earthquake in April 2016. Correa said that Ecuador is more 
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prepared than ever to receive investment; he asked that they would “help us to continue 
constructing ‘buen vivir’ in this Republic of opportunities,” (El Universo 2016).12  
 The Yasuní ITT-Initiative was a way for the Ecuadorian government to link 
Ecuador to the rest of the world through the notion of global green sovereignty. While 
Yasuní National Park is only a microcosm, it is representative of the possibility for 
climate change responsibility that has local, national, and worldwide benefits.
																																								 																					12	“Ayúdennos a continuar construyendo el buen vivir en esta República de oportunidades.”	
	 30	
Chapter 4: The International Politics of Climate Change Mitigation 
 This chapter examines the international politics associated with the Yasuní ITT-
Initiative, specifically how it was modeled to transcend political and ideological 
differences between nation states in order to receive climate change financing. I argue 
that developing countries do not have the power to enforce global climate change policies 
and instead must look to the international community for financing mechanisms. I further 
argue that the Yasuní ITT-Initiative was a groundbreaking model that sought to transition 
Ecuador to alternative forms of energy, primarily financed by developed countries that 
would assume financial responsibility for their ecological debt. To make this argument, I 
systematically review Ecuador’s economic history of resource extraction and oil 
development, official Yasuní ITT-Initiative documents, government publications and 
speeches concerning the Yasuní ITT-Initiative, and three main excerpts of publications 
from the Climate Change Journal and European Papers.13 This chapter consists of three 
sections that illustrate the dynamics of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and the accessibility of 
																																								 																					
13 The first source is a graph showing oil production in Ecuador from 1965 through 2010 from the 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy juxtaposed against world crude oil prices. The next source of 
evidence is a televised speech that Correa made in 2013 where he addressed the failure of the Yasuní ITT-
Initiative and his intention to dissolve the Yasuní Fund. Then I analyze Correa’s 2007 speech at the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, which was also cited in Chapter One. The speech was part of a dialogue 
concerning climate change in which Correa emphasizes the importance of the Amazon and how countries 
like Ecuador should be compensated for their contribution toward the mitigation of carbon emissions. 
Following this, I analyze the Correa administration’s Yasuní Fund and the U.N. documents associated with 
the trust. I also use donor narratives from social media accounts such as Twitter to show the reaction of 
other nations concerning the Yasuní ITT-Initiative. Finally, I look at the international mechanisms that 
exist for financing alternative forms of development, drawing primarily from the UN Framework on 
Climate Change (UNFCC) website and other U.N. documents such as the Paris Accord and the last three 
Climate Change Summits (COP21-24).   	
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climate change financing. The first section addresses Ecuador’s need to pursue alternative 
energy sources and its attempted transition into a post-petroleum society. The second 
section focuses on the environmental politics of the Yasuní ITT-Initiative as well as 
attempts to explain its ultimate failure. The third section looks at the international politics 
of climate change financing, the reward of ecological debts, and the creation of global 
green consciousness that will continue to challenge current notions of environmental 
care. 
 
4.1 Resource Extraction and the Push to Alternative Energy 
 Ecuador’s energy policy has been complex and often contradictory due to a 
variety of political and economic objectives that are difficult to achieve harmoniously. 
Tensions have arisen between conservation efforts and development projects, as well as 
between generating self-sufficient revenue sources and accepting foreign financing. 
Rafael Correa assumed the presidency under pressure from the international 
community to repay outstanding debts, indigenous and ecological organizations like 
CONAIE and AE were resisting development projects in the Amazon, and the majority of 
Ecuadorian citizens were unhappy with their current education, healthcare, and living 
standards. The Correa administration’s Revolución Ciudadana sought to address each of 
these issues by creating a new paradigm for socio-economic development. The Yasuní 
ITT-Initiative is one of the hallmarks of the Correa administration; in essence, it was a 
groundbreaking economic and political alternative that offered other extraction-
dependent countries a new method for achieving sustainable development (Lu, Valdivia, 
Silva 2017: 24). 
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 The Yasuní ITT-Initiative was innovative in its attempt to circumvent Ecuador’s 
reliance on petroleum extraction without suffering economic loss. The notion of Ecuador 
transitioning into a post-petroleum society is revolutionary; the country’s entire economic 
foundation is built on petroleum and resource extraction (Rival 2012). Since Texaco’s 
discovery of oil reserves in 1967 and subsequent boom in the 1970s, Ecuador’s economy 
was transformed. The economy’s previous reliance on cocoa and banana exports were 
dwarfed by the volumes of crude oil that were discovered in the Amazon region. Texaco 
constructed its first pipeline in 1972 that extended from the Eastern Amazon to the coast, 
making it the most active company in the Amazon until 1992 when it sold its holdings to 
PetroEcuador (Lu, Valdivia, Silva 2017: 70). 
Figure 4.1: Ecuador oil production (‘000 barrels/day), 1965-2010 
 
Figure 4.2 Crude Oil Prices, 1861-2015 
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Ecuador is heavily reliant on oil for economic growth and public investment. As 
mentioned in the literature review, Ecuador’s economy has suffered from a classic case of 
Dutch Disease, or the so-called resource curse. Oil’s price volatility, evident in Graph 
4.2, in part explains why Ecuador has lacked sustained development. However, the 
country’s problems are also self-inflicted. Governments have largely mismanaged the 
revenue generated by oil price booms, choosing to increase external debts, whereas oil 
price busts have caused long stretches of debt crises (Kaminsky&Vega 2014). For 
example, increased sovereign debt led to the collapse of the banking system and need for 
U.S. price stabilization in 2000. Graph 4.1 shows the beginning of oil production in the 
1970’s, the oil shock in 1987 and subsequent recovery through heavy investments during 
the 1990’s. Oil production peaked in 2006 at 550,000 barrels per day most likely 
correlating with Ecuador’s rejoining of OPEC in 2007. Ecuador’s oil production only 
dipped by 50,000 barrels per day during Correa’s first two years in office. This is 
important for two reasons: 1) it shows that despite the global economic crisis in 2008, 
Ecuador was not significantly affected by falling oil prices such as in 1987; 2) despite 
Correa’s emphasis on sustainability and seeking alternative forms of energy, he has relied 
on oil income in addition to Chinese loans for financing his reforms. 
 
4.2 Dynamics of the Yasuní ITT-Initiative and the Yasuní Fund 
 The Yasuní ITT-Initiative is a non-exploitative financial arrangement between the 
Ecuadorian government and the international community that put “social and 
environmental values first” by leaving the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) oil fields 
located in the Yasuní National Park undisturbed (ITT Trust 2010:2).  The project would 
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also mitigate deforestation effects and expand research and development efforts in 
renewable energy. The international community would contribute at least half of the 
revenue that the Ecuadorian government would have received if the oil was extracted; 
approximately 800 million barrels, worth over $7 billion USD if tapped, would require at 
least $3.6 billion in funds by 2024 (Valencia 2013).  
 The Yasuní ITT Trust Fund or Yasuní Fund, was administered in 2010 by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), to allow the international community 
safe investment in local Ecuadorian sustainable development, such as renewable energy 
projects in hydro, geothermal, solar, wind, biomass, and tidal power plants intended to 
change Ecuador’s energy matrix (ITT Trust 2010:5). The Yasuní Fund gave an original 
deadline of December 2011 for raising a minimum of $100 million USD in order for the 
project to continue. By the 2011 deadline, fundraising had exceeded $200 million USD 
and international feelings towards the project were optimistic. However, Yasuní’s 
popularity began to wane by 2012 and President Correa’s fundraising challenge of $291 
million USD by the end of 2013 was not accomplished. The Correa administration 
liquidated the Yasuní Fund in 2013; in his speech Rafael Correa explains, 
 “Unfortunately, the world has failed us. Up to date, there are only $13.3 million in funds 
 available deposited in the Yasuní ITT trust fund, which account for barely 0.37% of what 
 was expected. There are commitments not directly connected to the initiative for another  $116 
 million USD. I have signed an Executive Decree for the liquidation of the Yasuní ITT trust 
 fund, and with that put an end to the initiative. I have ordered the preparation of  technical, 
 economic, and legal reports, in order to, pursuant to Article 407 of the  Constitution, request that 
 the National Assembly declare the exploitation of oil in Yasuní to be of National Interest. 
 I quote Article 5, ‘In the event that the National Assembly authorizes the extraction activity it 
 cannot develop an area bigger than 1% of the Yasuní  NationalPark.’ State company 
 Petroamazonas will be in charge of the work,” (Correa de la Cadena 2013). 
 
The Initiative failed because of a variety of political and economic obstacles. In Correa’s 
speech announcing the end of the Yasuní project in 2013, he says,  
 “The proposal was intended to raise the world’s awareness and to generate a new reality: 
 demanding joint responsibility from the international community in the struggle against  global 
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 warming. I think the initiative was ahead of its time, and that those responsible for climate change 
 were unable or unwilling to understand it. We also had the misfortune of  having the launch 
 of the initiative coincide with the worst world economic crisis in the  past 80 years. But lets not 
 fool ourselves: the fundamental factor of the failure is the world is extremely hypocritical and the 
 logic that prevails is not that of justice, but of  power. The polluting countries are also the 
 richest and strongest ones, and if they have free access to environmental resources generated by 
 others, why should they pay something?” (Correa de la Cadena 2013) 
 
Correa blames developed countries for the lack of investment and attributes the 
initiative’s failure to political rather than tactical errors (Correa de la Cadena 2013). 
Scholars note that the project was at a disadvantage because it was the first carbon 
abatement model of its kind; the initiative most likely failed because it lacked 
sophisticated international coordination, something that can only be developed through 
trial and error (Escribano 2012). The topic itself is contentious and the plan confusing; it 
required “rich” countries to make financial contributions through the Yasuní Fund and 
the Ecuadorian government would allocate funds to chosen recipient organizations (ITT 
Trust 2010:3). While the idea of the Yasuní ITT-Initiative is revolutionary because it 
generated a new model of thinking about ecological responsibility, the biggest design 
flaw was the lack of clear structure in the financing mechanism. 
 The Yasuní Fund would be administered by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office 
(MPFT Office) of the UNDP and overseen by a “Steering Committee” led by the 
Ecuadorian Government. The Steering Committee would consist of eight representatives: 
Three representatives would be from the Ecuadorian government, one of which would 
serve as the Chairperson, two representatives would come from contributing 
governments, one would be an Ecuadorian civil society representative, and two would be 
members of the UNDP (Yasuní Trust 2010:14). Project reports would be released 
quarterly and each quarter the Steering Committee would verify that the funds were used 
accurately and appropriately (ITT Trust 2010:20). In order to ensure transparency, the 
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Steering Committee would publicly disclose on the Yasuní ITT websites (www.yasuni-
itt.gov.ec) and the UNDP website (http://mdtf.undp.org) records of decisions, summaries 
of proposed and approved projects, and progress reports (ITT Trust 2010:22). The 
projects themselves would be completely executed by Ecuadorian companies and the 
government would own all “equipment, supplies and other property financed by the 
Yasuní Fund” (ITT Trust 2010:22). These projects would then be subject to auditing. 
 The structure of the fund would be divided into two windows: the Capital Fund 
and the Revenue Fund Window (Yasuní Trust 2010:6). The Capital Fund Window would 
take contributions to the Yasuní Fund Account and used it to finance renewable energy 
projects submitted by Recipient Organizations. Each of the sectors targeted in the Capital 
Fund Window, such as hydropower or solar-power, would be represented by an approved 
Ecuadorian company who would borrow from the Capital Fund until it could repay 
(Yasuní Trust 2010:6). 
 The Revenue Fund Window would finance strategic sustainable development 
programs that were included in the Ecuadorian government’s National Development Plan 
for Good Living (Plan Nacional 2010). The Revenue Fund Window would finance plans 
for cultural and ecological conservation for the Tagaeri and Taromenane tribes, 
reforestation and environmental regeneration efforts, and support social development and 
energy research programs. The Revenue Fund Window would be financed with 
contributions from the Yasuní Fund (Yasuni Trust 2010:6). According to the Yasuní 
Trust, capital for the Yasuní Fund would come from contributions from:   
 “Governments, Intergovernmental Entities, Non-Governmental Organizations, Private 
 Foundations, Private-Sector Organizations, private individuals, public fund-raising events 
 following the prior approval of the Steering Committee, and income from the sale of Yasuni 
 Guarantee Certificates (CGYs) by the Ecuadorian government to private and public entities in 
 return for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions” (ITT Trust 2010:10).  
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The CGY’s were similar to shares that were offered by the Ecuadorian government as a 
means to make investment in the Yasuní Fund legitimate and to serve as guarantees for 
park conservation. The CGY’s were a guarantee backed by the Ecuadorian government 
for the face value of the amount contributed in USD.  The CGY’s would not earn interest 
nor would they expire as long as the government maintained its commitment to preserve 
the Yasuní oil reserves (ITT Trust 2010:11). The CGY’s were intended to act as a form 
of conservation easement land rights. The land has a fixed asset value that gives it rights 
to private conservation that trump state rights to exploit subsoil wealth. Yasuní National 
Park is state owned, which under Ecuadorian law excludes private land ownership, so the 
CGY’s advertisement as private land coupons is a confusing suggestion. When the 
Ecuadorian government decided to begin extraction from the ITT oil field, the issued 
CGY’s were made redeemable and the funds raised were no longer under the ownership 
of the state and were transferred back to the contributors. However, any amount 
contributed under $50,000 was not eligible to receive a CGY nor was it required to be 
returned; instead it was considered a donation rather than an investment and would be 
given to an unnamed social program (ITT Trust 2010:11).  
 The money returned in the form of CGYs is not discernable from the total gross 
amount of contributions that were reimbursed. The initiative received the official support 
of the German Parliament, with unanimous support from all the political parties, as well 
as the European Union, and other international organizations such as Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), Andean Development Corporation (CAF), the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), South American Union of Nations (UNSAR), 
Andean Community of Nations (CAN), Organization of American States (OAS), 
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International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), and 
various indigenous organizations and ecological groups in Ecuador (ITT Trust 2010:1). 
Despite widespread international support, the actual monetary investments in the Yasuní 
ITT Initiative were not enough to meet the projects requirements. Ultimately, the 
amounts that governments pledged to donate were significantly higher than what they 
actually contributed; approximately $50 million USD were expected and only $10.5 
million USD were deposited into the Yasuní Trust. The images below are from the 
Yasuní Capital Window published on the Yasuní Fund official U.N. site: 
The Yasuní Fund documents show the main contributors were mostly European countries 
like Turkey, Spain, and Australia, private sector companies, and private donors. Numbers 
from the Yasuní Fund can be misleading; they only show donations made directly to the 
Fund, when in reality the majority of large sums donations did not pass through the 
Figure	4.3	UNDP’s	Published	Yasuní	Capital	Window	
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UNDP Trust Fund but were instead donations made to the Yasuní National Park itself 
(Yasuní Fund, UNFCC). For example, Correa himself contributed $40 million USD that 
he won in a libel lawsuit, which is why it doesn’t show up on the ITT Trust log 
(Escribano 2012). Similarly, German Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and Social Democrat Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul contributed a one-time 
$48 million USD commitment for technical assistance in 2008 (Niebel 2010). Subsequent 
German Economic Minister Dirk Niebel, openly disagreed with Zeul’s contribution and 
the project itself. He says,  
 “I see Ecuador as a country which is rich in resources, but poor as a result of the actions of its 
 own government, which has plundered it for decades. The best thing for Ecuador would be to be 
 able to participate in global trade by means of oil production. No country can achieve development 
 relying solely on external aid. Rapid growth is the only way for Ecuador to alleviate poverty 
 among its population and reduce public debt. As far as I am concerned, preserving Yasuní and 
 leaving the oil in the ground is a left-wing delusion which helps no one…I am not interested in 
 talks with the Ecuadorian government. I do not approve of the kind of international fund 
 envisioned by Ecuador. I see these funds as being susceptible to corruption and difficult to 
 control,” (Niebel 2010). 
 
Germany did not contribute any payments through the Yasuní Fund nor was their initial 
contribution of $48 million USD reimbursed. 
 The lack of a consistent and structured method of financing was where the 
initiative received the most criticism. The blog Yasuní Forever writes that “it [the Yasuní 
Fund] hardly looks like a resounding triumph as it is a mixture of written off debts, a 
donation from the President of Ecuador himself and various others.” The blog is referring 
to the prime minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, who contributed $51 million USD by 
deducting it from the Ecuadorian debt to Italy. Given Ecuador’s history of sovereign 
default and Correa’s debt moratorium in 2008, repayment was unlikely, making Italy’s 
contribution relatively insignificant. The Ecuadorian government has been scrutinized for 
only reimbursing the amount listed on the Yasuní Fund (approximately $9 million USD) 
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in comparison to the excess of $190 million USD that was contributed outside of the 
Yasuní Fund mechanism, which was donated to an unnamed social program in Ecuador 
(ITT Trust 2010:16). 
 
4.3 International Politics of Climate Change Financing and the notion of Ecological 
Debt 
 Correa has said that the Yasuní ITT-Initiative was created to “inspire a spirit of 
global co-responsibility” in addressing environmental challenges (Correa de la Cadena 
2013). Despite its failure, the Yasuní ITT-Initiative offered developed and developing 
countries a new cooperative model that would “allow the world to consider more just and 
equitable paradigms of sustainable development,” (ITT Trust 2010:3). The Initiative 
required a significant amount of local, national, and international cooperation, which was 
its most pioneering aspect but also its greatest flaw. The Yasuní ITT-Initiative required 
the participation of the international community, especially the financial assistance of 
developed countries, in order to achieve greater equality (Rival 2010:359). The UNFCC 
refers to climate change as a global challenge; it does not respect national borders and 
people anywhere can be affected by harmful emissions (UNFCC 2010). The solution then 
must be solved at the international level; the Yasuní ITT-Initiative was the first proposed 
carbon abatement model through which an estimated 407 million metric tons of CO2 
would have been avoided (Correa de la Cadena 2013). The Yasuní ITT-Initiative sought 
to transcend borders and political differences between countries in order to receive 
financing to benefit Ecuador at a national level and global health at an international level.  
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 The idea of global mitigation based on ecological philanthropy is relatively new 
and therefore has not had time to develop a concrete financial or legal framework for 
supporting these efforts (UNFCC 2010). The first international political response to 
combatting climate change was the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 when the “Rio 
Convention” created the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC). The 
first legally binding agreement to combat climate change came out of the COP21 in Paris 
in 2015 when the Paris Agreement was proposed and accepted. Signatures for the Paris 
Agreement began in April 22, 2016 and 175 countries have signed to date. 
 Article 1:  
 a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
 industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
 industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of  climate 
 change;  
 c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 
 climate-resilient development.  
 Article 4:  
 4) Developed countries should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide  absolute 
 emission reduction targets.  
 Article 9: 
 3) As part of a global effort, developed countries should continue to take the lead in 
 mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting 
 the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-
 driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing  country Parties. 
 Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts. 
 (Paris Accord 2015) 
Article 1 stipulates that all countries, with an emphasis on developed countries 
and countries with the highest emissions, will work to limit global temperature rise. The 
Paris Agreement pledges financial assistance for developing countries in the amount of 
$100 billion annually to support sustainable low-carbon change; however, the financial 
mechanism, such as how and who will pay what amount, is unspecified and the recipient 
countries’ have not been listed. The idea is still in its preliminary stages and has been 
developed further at COP22 in Marrakech, Morocco in 2016 and the COP23 in Bonn, 
Germany in 2017 where the headlines for the conferences were “Low carbon innovation 
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in emerging regions” and “Accelerating green economic growth” (UNFCC COP23) 
These topics show that the international community is taking the Paris Agreement further 
and attempting to develop sustainable technologies and to expand low carbon sectors in 
all markets. The UNFCC has projected the Paris Agreement to continue to be a key 
document in the international response to climate change and a model for future Climate 
Conferences, such as the COP24 in Katowice, Poland in 2018.  
Article 9 of the Paris Agreement requires developed countries to take the lead 
financially, therefore shouldering most of the burden of financing their own carbon 
reduction and that of developing countries. The idea of ecological debt is a contentious 
issue because it is hard to quantify what impact certain levels of emissions will have in 
years, decades, or even centuries into the future. The notion of a developed country 
inherently being a rich country is also a point of contention; a rich country should have 
low debt and high GDP, but many developed countries may have a high GDP but a large 
amount of debt. It is therefore hard to implement or enforce any form of payment or 
punishment on developed countries for their part in climate change. Some scholars 
believe that the idea of rich countries financing developing countries will not work under 
the current economic model because countries do not have enough money to continually 
pay for environmental damages (Escribano 2012).  
In spite of these doubts, there are many supporters of this model for climate 
change mitigation, including Rafael Correa. Correa’s argument is that since developed 
countries have built their wealth on environmental exploitation and have contributed the 
most to the current environmental situation, it is only fair that they assume the majority of 
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the financial responsibility. In his General Assembly speech in September 2015 Correa 
said, 
 “Evidence suggest that consumption of energy and generation of emissions are directly 
 proportional to the level of income, which means that the consumption effect dominates  over the 
 efficiency effect, and an inhabitant of a rich country emits 38x times more than  an inhabitant of a 
 poor country. All of which raises the principle of common differentiated responsibilities. The 
 global inequities are not just reflected in distribution  of emissions but also in the impact of global 
 warming and climate change. Counties like Ecuador produce less than 0.1% of total CO2 
 emissions but are suffering the consequences of climate change,” (Correa 2015) 
 
In his speech, Correa raises the question of responsibility based on income level; he 
points to the countries that consume and pollute the most, usually the wealthiest, that 
need to recognize these inequalities. In this speech Correa proposes a new type of 
financial assistance for developing countries; while the Yasuní ITT-Initiative required 
donations, this new model would compensate countries in the Amazon for their global 
emission reductions.  
 “The countries of the Amazon Basin also produce goods of free access, in this case 
 environmental goods that regulate the global climate, and without which life on the planet 
 would severely deteriorate. Despite this, the great big global polluters pay nothing for 
 consuming those environmental goods and services. Sometimes it is thought that the 
 generation of environmental goods has no cost but the reality is that it can be very costly,  not in 
 terms of direct cost, but in terms of what we are renouncing,” (Correa 2015). 
 
Correa is proposing that the Amazon’s creation of oxygen is a common resource for all 
nations and should be compensated as an environmental good or “ecosystem service.” 
This proposal is similar to the Yasuní ITT-Initiative because it is a means for 
sustainability and ecological preservation but also a means for financing development.  
 Correa also took the opportunity to propose an international law that would 
include the rights of nature, modeled off of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution.  
 “It is necessary to move towards a universal declaration of the rights of nature. The principal 
 universal right of nature should be that it can continue to exist, but also that it can continue to offer 
 the means for life that are necessary for our societies to continue living with the sumak kawsay,” 
 (Correa 2015). 
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While Correa’s Yasuní ITT-Initiative would mostly benefit Ecuador, he has suggested 
changes that would have global impacts. Despite the Yasuní ITT-Initiative’s failure in 
implementation, it was successful in creating green global consciousness. This new 
consciousness would not be hindered by borders or political or ideological differences, 
and would transcend traditional notions of sovereignty and create a new means of global 
environmental care. 
 
4.4 International Challenges to a Post-petroleum Transition 
 The Yasuní-ITT Initiative was revolutionary in its intentions and methods. 
Perhaps its biggest contribution to the international community is a reinforcement of the 
idea that climate change responsibility is here to stay. Climate change and ecological debt 
have become key topics at Climate Change Summits; similarly, the challenge of 
transitioning into a post-petroleum society will continue into the foreseeable future. The 
most difficult aspect will likely be eliminating and holding accountable the biggest 
companies responsible for environmental damages and our world’s dependence on 
petroleum (Frumhoff 2015:160). A study has found the top 90 companies with the 
highest emissions have produced 63% of the cumulative global emissions of industrial 
carbon dioxide and methane between 1751 and 2010 (Heede 2010:229). They have 
produced about 914 gigatons of CO2 emissions and all but seven of the 90 companies are 
energy giants who produce oil, gas and coal. The remaining seven companies were 
cement manufacturers (Heede 2010:229). This research shows that in order to combat 
global emissions, we must combat our reliance on unclean energy and instead invest in 
developing more sustainable and environmentally friendly technologies. Another group 
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of scholars suggests that global emissions would fall by more than 24% at a cost of 0.3% 
of world GDP by 2020, given international financial transfers to developing countries for 
approximately €32 billion (Frumhoff 2015:160). They argue that by investing a large sum 
of money now, developing countries will be able to contribute and pay back the 
investment in the future. Generating this amount of capital would be difficult, but this 
type of project faces the same challenges as the comparably much smaller Yasuní ITT-
Initiative; it requires a high level of international coordination and structures that do not 
exist yet, making this an issue of global importance for the future 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 The Correa administration began to transition Ecuador into a post-petroleum 
society by seeking alternative forms of financing sustainable development, primarily 
through Chinese investment and accessing global finance mechanisms. The Correa 
administration’s conservation efforts and transition toward clean energy conflict with his 
expectations of increased oil production; these contradictions are evident in energy policy 
inconsistencies (Haddad 2012:16). The Revolución Ciudadana was the primary way in 
which the Correa administration attempted to discursively frame itself as environmentally 
conscious, both at the national and international level. The Yasuní-ITT Initiative is an 
example of how the Correa administration recognized and attempted to remedy the 
struggle between socio-economic development and ecological preservation. Correa 
sought to create projects that would create a new narrative, replacing the oil sector’s 
negative record in Ecuador. 
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 The Yasuní-ITT Initiative faced structural, institutional, and political limitations 
that contributed to its failure. While Correa exclusively blames the unwillingness of 
developed countries to take responsibility for their ecological debt, the project had design 
flaws that made contributing difficult. The Initiative was revolutionary in that it created a 
global consciousness and sense of co-responsibility; however, this aspect required a 
significant amount of local, national, and international cooperation that was not possible 
at the time.  
 The Yasuní ITT-Initiative promoted global green sovereignty by inviting other 
nations to join a movement for solidarity in combatting climate change. The initiative 
was a way to rethink sovereignty in general: local and state sovereignty would be 
replaced by global sovereignty that is governed by environmentally sustainable policies. 
Global green sovereignty restructures individual interests and begins to think about 
interconnected worldwide interests such as the pressing issue of climate change.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Final Remarks 
 This thesis centrally asks: How did the Yasuní ITT project transform notions of 
sovereignty and environmental care in Ecuador? I argue that the Ecuadorian government, 
through the Yasuní ITT initiative, sought to create new means of creating revenue to 
finance development. I named the idea of using an international redistribution framework 
as an alternative to extractivist fueled development: “global green sovereignty.” This 
global green sovereignty stresses the abdication of national autonomy over development 
in favor of a post-petroleum economy.  
 In the third chapter I discuss how Correa used “21st century socialism” as a 
symbol of “post-neoliberalism” in Latin America (De Sousa Santos 2010). The Correa 
administration has sought means to receive financial assistance to circumvent oil 
dependency and create a post-petroleum society grounded in the ideas of Buen Vivir. The 
Correa administration primarily looked toward Chinese investment in hydroelectric 
facilities as a means to unwind Ecuador’s oil dependency and promote sustainable 
development. Many doubt the government’s commitment to environmental protection, 
especially because of Ecuador’s growing debt to China (Martinez 2014). It is important to 
monitor Chinese and Ecuadorian relations in the future. In addition to Chinese 
investment, the Yasuní ITT-Initiative was an attempt to achieve sustainable development 
in Ecuador. The Yasuní-ITT Initiative created a political alternative that would use 
international redistribution to fund local development projects, thereby benefitting 
Ecuador at the local and national level as well as the world. 
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 In the fourth chapter I suggest that the idea of environmental co-responsibility 
will continue to be at the forefront of U.N. Climate Change Summits because developing 
countries do not have the power to enforce climate change policies. Developing countries 
like Ecuador look to the international community for financing mechanisms, such as the 
redistributive network proposed in The Yasuní ITT-Initiative. The initiative’s biggest 
legacy is the creation of the notion of a green global consciousness. This new 
consciousness will not be hindered by borders, political or ideological differences and 
would transcend traditional notions of sovereignty and create a new means of 
environmental care. The Yasuní ITT-Initiative was the Correa administrations attempt at 
transitioning Ecuador into a post-petroleum society; its failure can be partly attributed to 
the pioneering aspects of the model, which lacked sophisticated international 
coordination because of its novelty. In future Climate Conferences, such as the COP24 in 
Katowice, Poland in 2018 will be interesting to see what type of economic investment 
model will triumph and whether the Paris Agreement continues to be a key document 
utilized in climate change discussions.  
 My thesis offers a unique contribution to literature surrounding Ecuadorian 
economic development and indigenous sovereignty. This thesis combines literature about 
the Correa administrations in the context of Ecuadorian economic history, political 
history, and the developing history of climate change responsibility. This thesis discuses 
the idea of global green sovereignty, a term that describes the goal of realizing 
alternatives to extraction-fueled economic development in favor of sustainable methods 
that are supported and promoted at the international level. This thesis links the concepts 
of climate change responsibility and sustainable development by suggesting that the 
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Yasuní-ITT Initiative has the potential to set the precedent for oil dependent countries 
seeking to unwind their oil dependency without sacrificing development.  
 Finally, it is important to recognize that this thesis encountered a variety of 
limitations in both the quantity and quality of information available. First, I was 
researching a topic that occurred over a decade prior so it was difficult to find interviews 
or narratives that gave a direct point of view instead of a summary. For instance, I wish I 
could have used twitter posts during the Pachaktik movement as well as had better access 
to information from the Texaco trial. Similarly, my research on the Waorani was limited 
to government media publications and the ONHAE website, both of which are not geared 
toward answering research questions. My thesis, especially in Chapter 4, would have 
benefitted from hands on fieldwork. I also encountered a lot of vague and non-published 
information, especially in financial documents. While the Ecuadorian government 
claimed complete transparency with the Yasuní Fund, its publications regarding the 
amount and to which recipient organizations was unclear and when reported on financial 
statements were conveniently left unnamed.
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